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1. Introduction 
This article proposes to divide the public self in the sense of Hirose's 
three-tier model into two levels, which agree with two modes of self-reference by I 
and that by you in English. It also clarifies why the indefinite you and Japanese 
hito denoting an ethically good person function like quantifiers in light of the 
speaker's replicable use of address terms. Specifically, I take up examples like (1): 
( 1) When I went to work midnights a few months ago, it was 
discovered that I didn't have a nickname. You need one, to talk 
casually over the radio: "Stix, you getting coffee?" ... and I always 
thought that nicknaming yourself was like talking to yourself, 
smnething that made you look foolish if you were overheard. 
(Laffey (2000:141)) 
In ( 1 ), the author talks about himself, but from the second sentence on, he uses you 
and yourself for self-reference. He seems to have considered the kind of context in 
which he switches from I to you, or in which someone else may replace him as an 
author. Thus, unlike the first sentence whose content is available only to him, the 
contexts having you as parts contain information to which anyone has access. 
In Japanese, hito 'person' can be similarly used in a similar context, as in (2): 1 
(2) Min-na as obi tai ga, hito-wa hi to-no 
All. people play want but person-TOP person-GEN 
sukina yo om iki rare nm. 
fond.of way live can NEG 
'Everyone wants to play, but a person cannot live in the way he 
likes.' 
• This is part of my on-going research on Southeast Asian English with special reference to 
personal pronouns. Portions of this article were presented at a regular meeting of Fukuoka 
Linguistics Circle in April 20, 2013 in which I talked about third person singular pronouns standing 
for the reader's intimate partner. I am grateful to students of Shimonoseki City University, who 
taught me a title of Taylor Swift's song, which gave me the basic idea developed here. I benefited 
very much from discussions with Yukio Hirose, Toshiko Yamaguchi, Hiroshi Ohashi, Shigeki Seki, 
Hiroaki Konno, Hironobu Kasai and Akira Ito. I thank the anonymous TES reviewers for their 
helpful comments on the draft of this article. The remaining inadequacies are entirely my own. 
1 The following abbreviations are used in the glosses of examples in this article: ACC = 
accusative, COP= copula, GEN = genitive, IMP= imperative, LOC = locative, NEG =negative, 
NOM= nominative, QUOT = quotative, TOP= topic. 
Tsukuba English Studies (2013) vo/.32, 71-90 
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When used in dialogue, the two occurrences of hito in (2) are in an anaphoric 
relation with each other, and can refer either to the addressee or to the speaker. 
These uses of you and hito have much to do with Hirose's three-tier model, 
especially with his division of the private and the public self. Focusing on the 
nature of the public self, I argue that it consists of two hierarchical levels: The 
lower level provides the contrast between speaker and addressee because they are 
two different individuals, but the higher level neutralizes the contrast, because at this 
level, anyone is a replicable instance of the normal, or ethically good, person. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Hirose's three-tier 
model with special reference to the division of the private and the public self. 
Section 3 discusses the indefinite reference uses of you in English, pointing out how 
and why it has quantificational effects. Section 4 deals with Japanese hito standing 
for dialogue participants. Section 5 focuses on the two levels of the generalized 
and the particularized public self. Section 6 offers concluding remarks. 
2. A Partial Review of Hirose's Three-Tier Model 
Before starting our discussion, we first review the basic points of Hirose's 
three-tier model. I have to say that I discuss his model only partially in relation to 
the division of the speaker between the private and the public self, as reflected in 
grammatical differences between zibun 'self' and other self-referential terms like 
watasi 'I' in Japanese. According to Hirose (2000, 2013), the private self is an 
aspect of the speaker which is separated as the subject of thinking or consciousness 
and the public self is that of the speaker separated as the subject of communicating. 
Given this definition, a question appears whether or not the public self is the 
speaker's possession in the way the private self is. I argue that it is the role given 
to him in dialogue rather than his possession, which is supported by the fact that hito 
in Japanese can be used both as self-reference and address terms only in dialogue. 2 
Hirose (20 13:11) argues that zibun represents the speaker's private self, and 
that it can be equally anaphoric to any person-denoting antecedent, whether that 
antecedent refers to the speaker, or to the addressee, or to a third party, as in (3): 
(3) Zibun-wa zettaini tadasii to {boku/kimi/kare }-wa 
self-TOP absolutely right QUOT {I/you/he }-TOP 
omot-ta. 
think-PAST 
Literally, 'Selfi be absolutely right, {I/you/hed thought.' 
2 In what follows without any sexist connotations, I use a masculine pronoun like he to refer 
back to the speaker or the thinker, or simply to a person, and a feminine pronoun like she to refer 
back to the addressee where their actual sexes are irrelevant. 
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This is because, as Hirose argues, the concept of private self is equally distributed to 
anyone who takes himself to be the subject of thinking or consciousness, and zibun 
is specialized to represent it without having to do with the question of whose private 
self it represents. He also notes that English lacks a pronoun equivalent to zibun. 
The difference between zibun, standing for the private self, and those terms 
standing for the public self is made obvious in ( 4 ), where the first conditional clause 
creates a hypothetical world in which the speaker turns into the addressee, and the 
subject of the second clause refers in fiction to her, or her image, as well as to him. 
To express the second subject, watasi and otoosan 'father' are fine, but zibun is not, 
and Hirose's theory is able to account for the acceptability difference. As in ( 4b ), 
the self-referential otoosan is used only by a father whose addressee is his child. 
(4) a. Watasi-ga omae-nara, watasi-wa sono-sigoto-o hikiuke-nai. 
I-NOM you COP.if I-TOP the job-ACC accept-NEG 
'Ifi were you, I would not accept the job.' 
b. Otoosan-ga omae-nara, otoosan-wa sono-sigoto-o 
Father-NOM youCOP.if father-TOP the-job-ACC 
hikiuke-nai. 
accept-NEG 
'If I were you, father (the speaker) would not accept the job.' 
c. * Watasi-ga omae-nara, zibun-wa sono-sigoto-o hikiuke-nai 
I NOM you COP.if self-TOP the-job-ACC accept-NEG 
Literally, 'If I were you, the self (the speaker) would not accept the 
job.' 
In colloquial Japanese, the most natural wording for the message made in ( 4) is a 
subject-less version of the second clause, as in watasi ga omae-nara, ¢ sono-sigoto 
o hikiuke-nai: This indicates that like watasi and otoosan, the null subject stands 
for the public, rather than private, self, but this is not relevant to the present 
discussion. 
This context of exchanging identities requires the second subject to stand for 
the speaker's self that communicates with and, in a hypothetical world, is combined 
with part of the addressee's self ( cf. Pelletier (2004 )); since this combination of the 
two selves is produced only in dialogue, it belongs to the public self, and is readily 
expressed by the terms for it. On the other hand, zibun specifically stands for the 
speaker's private self, so it cannot stand for such a self that is specific to dialogue. 
This contrast reveals the nature of the public self. As the speaker can enjoy 
it only in dialogue with his addressee, it is not a person's property, but a speaker's 
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role provided in turn by the rule of dialogue to which both participants agree. 
Hirose (20 13: 15) says that in English, you is chosen to represent people in 
general, treating you in this use as the same in meaning as the generic one. This is 
true of the proverb in ( 5), which is paraphrased as "One cannot live by bread alone": 
(5) You cannot live by bread alone. 
Like you in (1 ), reference of the generic one, too, can be as narrow as the speaker's 
self-reference. Despite the similarities, closer examination reveals differences in 
meaning between you and one. Moreover, he does not ask why you can assimilate 
to one typically in generic sentences-a question which needs to be answered. 
Hirose (20 13: 15) also points out that like you, hi to in Japanese is selected to 
represent people in general, as in (6), where hito 1 and hito2 are disjoint in reference: 
( 6) Hi to 1-wa tosi-o toru ni-ture, hito2 kara 
person-TOP age-ACC get as other. person from 
manabu koto-ga ooku naru. 
learn thing-NOM more become 
'The older one gets, the more one learns from other people.' 
He does not discuss why hito, denoting basically one person, is adopted to stand for 
people in general like you, but I argue that this is because both follow the same 
heuristic to be quantified by the speaker's replicable act of addressing the addressee. 
I use "replicability" in the technical sense of van Hoek ( 1997): According to 
van Hoek, replicability is a characteristic of quantified noun phrases like every boy, 
where the nominal denotes a representative instance, and the quantifier produces a 
set of replicas from that instance. In this way, what is grammatically a singular 
noun phrase can refer to a set of referents that are replicas of one representative. 
The replicability is adapted to apply to replicable address terms like you in 
English and hi to in Japanese; for example, the indefinite you semantically denotes a 
representative addressee, and the quantifier is replaced by a replicable act of 
addressing, thereby ensuring that in the context of replicable addressing, its 
reference replicates itself to cover a whole set of addressees, as we will see shortly. 
3. The Indefinite Reference Uses of You in English 
We identify the nature of the speaker's self represented by you and the 
constraints on this way of self-reference, first by examining the type of context 
where the self-referential you occurs, and second by reviewing the characteristics of 
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the indefinite reference uses of you so that they include the self-referential you as a 
subtype for referring specifically to what I call "the generalized public self." 
Hirose (20 13) argues that I in English belongs to the same class of terms as 
watasi and otoosan in Japanese, standing basically for the speaker's public self. I 
say "basically" because I can also be diverted into standing for the speaker's private 
self in his account-a point which we do not discuss in the present article. 
The main issue here is concerned with you rather than with I, however. It 
follows from Hirose's definition that the self-referential you represents the speaker's 
public self like I does, since it refers to an aspect of the speaker who communicates 
with the addressee. Now we should ask how the speaker's self represented by you 
differs from the public self represented by I, for there should be a difference in level 
of generality between the public self represented by I and that represented by you. 
Komori ( 1992:191) points out with the example in (7) that there are contextual 
constraints on the speaker, or actually the narrator, who uses you for self-reference: 
(7) I'm proud to tell people I'm a policeman. For other people, I 
don't know if it's a mixture of fear and respect or what, but you're 
not just a regular Joe, you're a policeman. I'm the first person in 
the family to be a policeman. 
Komori accounts for the context for the self-referential you in terms of the empathy 
that the speaker wants the addressee to have with him, assuming that it is expressed 
in his reference to himself by the pronoun by which she refers to herself. 
Makishita (1997 :32) gives a similar account to the following confessional 
passages, where the speaker shifts from I to you for self-reference: 
(8) a. 
b. 
I mixed my drinks, that was my mistake. That's what goes to 
your head. It hurts. 
I played billiards with a friend of mine and that very night he died. 
Something like that sticks in your mind. 
In the second sentences of (8), your is close to my, which marks the context where 
the speaker wants to generalize his experience to what everyone will agree with. 
The difference in level of self-reference between I and you leads me to argue 
that the public self consists of two levels; the particularized and the generalized. 
The particularized public self at the lower level shows itself in particular situations: 
This is clear in Japanese, where the speaker has to change his self-reference term 
depending on the addressee. The generalized public self at the higher level shows 
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itself in generalized situations where all speakers use the same term to address the 
addressee. Specifically, it exhibits the following three discourse functions: 
(9) 1. It represents the speaker's constant right to engage in dialogue with 
any addressee, 
11. it brings about quantificational effects, 
111. it can be used as an indirect self-reference term. 
In English, you, but not I, exhibits all the three functions, for I does not show 
quantificational effects. The speaker, or more precisely, his particularized public 
self, has identity in him, and so cannot be quantified. By contrast, the speaker as a 
communicator of the generalized public self may address a different addressee on a 
different occasion in replicable fashion, which allows addressees to be quantified. 
The three functions in (9) can be summarized as the following heuristic: 
(1 0) Addressees' heuristic for finding an implicit quantifier to make 
dialogue self-relevant: Derive a generic quantifier from reference 
to the speaker's generalized public self to put your own in its 
scope. 
This heuristic applies to you in English and to hi to in Japanese, and captures the fact 
that what are originally terms denoting individuals are adopted to express general 
statements. The addressee takes a speaker who performs replicable addressing not 
as an individual speaker, but rather as an instance of these addressees replicated, 
because when the generalized public self talks with a replicable addressee, what is 
true of one instance is also true of other instances, which neutralizes the distinction 
between speaker and addressee, or between speaker and any other third party. 
One question arises as to the nature of the speaker's right in (9i). Since any 
addressee turns into a speaker in dialogue, this right is, by definition, given to any 
speaker. Also since it is a matter of convention of language use in a particular 
language, it is not a person's property or something that a person has as his 
possession, but rather is a general rule to be followed by any person who uses that 
language to participate properly in dialogue. In short, the generalized public self 
stands for a role that every dialogue participant assigns himself in the language. 
An English speaker can, in fact must, always address the addressee by you, 
irrespectively of whether the person addressed is male or female, older or younger 
than the speaker, socially stronger or weaker than he, familiar or unfamiliar with 
him, and so forth. These differences in personal relation between speaker and 
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addressee can be encoded by modifying you, like you honey or you bitch. However, 
such modifiers are optional and do not affect the fact that you in English is a 
versatile address term which is free from the matters of social deixis. This means 
that he uses you to quantify the number of addressees when he repeatedly uses you 
to address an addressee on one occasion, address another addressee on another 
occasion, and address still another addressee on still another occasion, thus allowing 
that replicates of you's addressee will cover a generic set of people. This is why 
the indefinite you assimilates in range of reference to the generic one, as in (5). 
This leads us to assume that the indefinite you has a quantifier in it, because, 
as a first approximation, it is paraphrased as 'each addressee,' and the understood 
quantifier is responsible for the generic sense it accompanies in its context. 
Actually, you can function as a quantifier to bind a pronoun in a magazine 
article title like the one in ( 11 ), where him is taken to be a bound pronoun in such a 
way that for each addressee x, xis asked whether x lets x's sweetheart pay for dates: 
( 11) Should you still let him pay for dates? 
I - tt 
cf 
ELLE, Singapore, February 2013, front cover 
Third person singular pronouns used in this way are characteristically antecedentless, 
and are often found in the tense-less contexts of advertising phrases and article titles 
of Southeast Asian magazines for young people interested in or concerned with 
relationship with the opposite sex. Such pronouns typically stand for a sweetheart 
or someone intimate of each reader, more precisely, someone of the opposite sex 
with whom each reader takes herself to be intimate. Thus, the indefinite you as a 
quantifier may introduce a bound pronoun: It quantifies a set of readers, each of 
whom has someone intimate in mind, and within its scope, the reference of a third 
person pronoun for that someone covaries with the reference of the indefinite you. 
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Bolinger (1979:20 1) notes that the indefinite you, but not the generic one, is 
characteristically used in sentences whose generalization is believed to be normal by 
the speaker himself. As in ( 12b ), generalizations introduced with you turn to be 
unnatural when they are forced to express what is considered out of the norm: 
(12) a. How does one get from London to Oxford?- Well, one way IS by 
boat upstream from Westminster. 
b. How do you get from London to Oxford?- ?Well, one way IS by 
boat upstream from Westminster. 
London and Oxford are connected with a canal, so the sentence in ( 13 b) is true in a 
way, but the normal choice is the bus or train to move between the two places. 
This suggests that the quantifier assumed to be involved in the indefinite you 
does not quantify addressees in general, but rather quantifies only a subset of them. 
This is supported by the following examples, taken from Bolinger (1979:202), who 
observes that you is different from other personal pronouns in generic use in that it is 
suited for expressing the normal and typical cause-and-effect relation in parataxis: 
(13) a. You try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits you. 
b. * One tries to tell him something, he hauls off and hits one. 
c. ?? They try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits them. 
d. ? We try to tell him something, he hauls off and hits us. 
An addressee of the indefinite you takes a cause-and-effect relation as if she was 
responsible for it only when that relation is normal and typical, so she can find her 
own counterpart in it. Other pronouns lack such a personal simulation. 
The quantifier assumed in you is in line with the following contrast, observed 
by Bolinger (1979:202), where the second sentence with you is outside the scope of 
the quantifier of the first sentence, but can inherit, or reproduce the quantification: 
(14) a. Everybody loses a loved one- but when it happens you realize it's 
not a cause for you or anybody to despair. 
b. * Everybody loses a loved one- but when it happens one realizes it's 
not a cause for one or anybody to despair. 
This is because the indefinite you functions as an equivalent to every. 3 Since the 
3 As Hironobu Kasai pointed out (personal communication), in ( 14a), the postulated 
quantifier may work well with the first occurrence of you, but not with its second occurrence, since 
the quantifier, if any, would force a wrong interpretation saying that ... every addressee realizes it's 
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generic one is unusable in the act of replicable addressing, it cannot (re)produce 
quantification by itself, but can only accept it. Thus, it is unacceptable here. 
To combine these observations with Kaplan's (1977 /1989) thesis that a deictic 
term has a character, or a constant linguistic meaning, the character of the indefinite 
you can be paraphrased as describing the addressee's self-consciousness about the 
membership to the set of people who are equal in the addressee's status, as in (15): 
(15) (each) addressee who takes herself to be one of the addressees 
This means that the indefinite you covers only those who take themselves to be in 
the generalization expressed by the sentence involving you. Here the quantifier in 
parentheses is not a proper part of, but is constantly supplied to, the character of you. 
The character proposed in (15) is supported by the contrasts in (16), taken 
from Kitagawa and Lehrer (1990:7 51), where the indefinite you welcomes only 
addressees each of whom assumes herself to be in a drama whose main character is 
in Egypt. Since such a specific assumption is unnatural in generic sentences, the 
terms that welcome everyone in generic sentences are unnatural in ( 16). 
(16) a. You are in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that you have 
really left your own world and time behind when suddenly you 
meet your next-door neighbor from home. 
b. ? One is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and feeling that he has 
really left his own world and time behind when suddenly he meets 
his next-door neighbor from home. 
c. {?*Everyone/* Anyone} is in Egypt admiring the pyramids and 
feeling that they have really left their own world and time behind 
when suddenly they meets their next-door neighbor from home. 
Instead of universal quantification, the referential range of the indefinite you is a 
limited set of people who are relevant to the locally-understood normal cases. 
In sum, the indefinite you involves a sense of norm because it refers to an 
addressee who takes herself to be a member of a larger set; such an addressee has 
the self-consciousness of having equal membership with others who are equally 
addressed by you, i.e. normal people in general. This means that an addressee with 
not a cause for every addressee or anybody ... , where the two occurrences of every addressee have 
to talk about two different people (cf. Btiring (2005:82)). Structural details need to be studied, but 
this means that you may accompany a quantifier only when it is a topic which has scope over the 
rest of the sentence, and otherwise, it is free from it. This agrees with my claim that the quantifier, 
or a quantificational function, is not in you as such, but rather in the addressing act expressed by 
you. 
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that self-consciousness is to follow what is normally accepted and replicated among 
normal people, and this is the source of the norm expressed by the indefinite you. 
It is not that you has a quantifier in it, but that the replicable addressing by you 
brings about quantificational effects. The quantificational effects associated with 
you do not belong to its properties, but to the context in which it is used. As we see 
in the next section, the same point can be made in relation to hito in Japanese. 
4. The Modal Hito in Japanese Standing for Dialogue Participants 
As mentioned in section 2, it is characteristic of Japanese to linguistically 
divide the particularized public self into particularized public selves in such a way 
that the speaker has to change his self-reference term depending on the addressee, 
especially the child addressee; for example, the speaker who talks to his son calls 
himself otoosan, one who talks to his pupils calls himself sensee 'teacher', and a 
police officer calls himself omawarisan 'police officer' when he talks to a child who 
comes to ask him for help because he is a police officer. Each of these terms serves 
as a mirror for the speaker to define his role for the addressee, and this applies not 
only to these role descriptions, but also to lexical self-reference terms like watasi. 
To call himself watasi, the speaker has to agree with the addressee in using the 
self-reference term as a polite adult, for it is in a social deictic contrast with other 
self-reference terms like baku (used by a male in humble style), ore (used by an 
arrogant male), and atasi (used by a female when talking with her friend). Choice 
of one of these terms reflects the personal relation between dialogue participants. 
In parallel with a collection of self-reference terms, Japanese has a collection 
of address terms each of which encodes a unique personal relation between speaker 
and addressee; for example, a speaker who addresses by kimi is superior to the male 
addressee, one who does by kisama is hostile to him, one who does by anata takes a 
polite attitude toward the addressee, and one who does by omae is superior to her in 
a commanding way. Japanese does not have a versatile address term like you, and 
replicates of the addressee of a given address in Japanese term are limited in number 
and type, and such terms are unqualified to stand for a generic set of people. 
Exceptionally, hi to is a term which can be addressed to anybody in Japanese; 
as in ( 17), it is suited for a speaker who needs to address the addressee indirectly: 
(17) Hi to-ga suru koto ni-wa sippai mo aru. 
person-NOM do thing LOC-TOP mistake also exist 
'There are also mistakes in things that a person does.' 
When read out of context, this hito may be a generic term, but in dialogue, it is well 
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used to stand for either speaker or addressee. The speaker can use hito to indirectly 
address anyone, irrespectively of whether the addressee is younger or older than he 
is, higher or lower in status than he is, or friendly or unfriendly with him. Thus, 
like you, replicas of the addressee for hito can extend to a generic set of people. 
To discuss the hito as an indirect address term, we first need to distinguish at 
least three uses of hi to, as in ( 18). The referential use in ( 18i) is free from modal 
restrictions and occurs in contexts that describe specific situations about someone 
other than those present in dialogue. The generic use in ( 18ii) occurs only in the 
context of generalization, but such generalizations need not be about ethical or 
moral values. The hito in ( 18iii) is most limited in use, for it occurs only in modal 
generalizations in which all dialogue participants talk about what people should do. 
(18) i. Hi to-ga mt-eru. 
person-NOM see-can 
'A person is visible.' (referential to a third-person individual) 
11. Hito-wa nisoku-hokoo-suru. 
person-TOP biped.walk-do 
'A person walks on two feet.' (denoting a generic set of people) 
111. Hito-ga suru koto ni-wa sippai mo aru. (= (17)) 
In fact, hito in ( 18iii) differs in meaning from hito in ( 18i) and ( 18ii); it means not 
just 'person,' but 'ethically good person,' thanks to which it occurs only in contexts 
that have to do with the contrast between ethically-good and ethically-bad people. 
As shown in ( 19), the hi to in ( 18i) and ( 18ii) can be restrictively modified by 
an adjective, but the hi to in ( 18iii) (henceforth, the modal hito) cannot: 
(19) a. Wakai 
young 
hi to-ga mi-eru. 
person-NOM see-can 
'A young person is visible.' 
b. Wakai hito-wa tairyoku-ga aru. 
young person-TOP physical.strength-NOM exist 
'A young person has physical strength.' 
c. (*)Wakai hito-wa wakai hito-no sukina yoom iki 
young person-TOP young person-GEN fond. of way live 
rare na1. 
can NEG 
'A young person cannot live in the way a young person is fond of.' 
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The example in ( 19c) is acceptable only in the reading in which wakai hi to refers to 
a generic set of young people excluding speaker and addressee, and is unacceptable 
in the reading in which it is intended as an indirect address term. This is because 
the modal hito is different in meaning from the hito in ( 18i) and ( 18ii). It has the 
sense of 'an ethically good person whom everyone can and should mimic as a model' 
and this sense defies restrictive modification, which would contradict its sense of 
denoting a model whom anyone or all kinds of people can and should mimic. 
The modal hito is used for an indirect reference to the addressee typically 
when the speaker talks about a moral with her. In such contexts, it is taken to be an 
indirect address term as well as an indirect self-reference term, because it refers to a 
model person with whom both speaker and addressee can equally identify 
themselves. Thus, the speaker can express an aspect of his public self with hito, 
but that is not what he has in his possession; it is a role given to him in dialogue. 
Suzuki (1996:132-150) and Miki (1998) point out that hito is used as a 
self-reference term only when the speaker is angry at the addressee, as in (20): 
(20) Hito-no hanasi -o 
person-GEN story-ACC 
'Listen to what I say.' 
kike. 
listen. to .IMP 
In this case, the hito is clearly self-referential, and does not refer to the addressee. 
However, the previous studies did not discuss how the self-referential hito is related 
to the modal hito, nor the fact that the modal hito is partly self-referential and partly 
addressee-oriented. In the present account, this self-referential use is derived from 
the modal hito denoting a discourse participant. In other words, it is a by-product 
of the fact that the speaker does not regard the addressee as a proper addressee, 
because he is angry at her, and does not regard her as an ethically good person. 
Here is how the self-referential use is derived. Semantically, the modal hito 
denotes a dialogue participant, but, due to the current addressee's failure to make a 
cooperative relation with the speaker, the dialogue participants in question do not 
include her, because she does not qualify as an ethically good person. Thus, the 
modal hito referring to the dialogue participants excluding the current addressee 
ends up in referring only to the current speaker. Thus, there is no need for hito to 
have a separate sense of self-reference, because it is contextually derived from its 
sense of denoting the generalized public self as an ethically good person. 
5. Contrasts between the Generalized and the Particularized Public Self 
Both in English and Japanese, the unmarked choice of self-reference IS m 
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terms of the particularized public self, and self-reference in terms of the generalized 
public self is the marked choice. Japanese has a number of different terms for 
standing for the former self, but in English, there is virtually one word for the 
particularized public self, i.e. I, which denotes a basic role of the speaker addressing 
the addressee. In other words, I denotes the speaker's basic role defined on the 
addressee's part. This does not mean that English speakers cannot divide the 
particularized public self into public selves in the way Japanese speakers can. It is 
only that I can cover different aspects of the particularized public self, as in (21 ): 
(21) I'm only me when I'm with you. 
This is a title of Taylor Swift's song, where I and me stand for two different aspects 
of the singer's public self, with the former standing for her self communicating with 
anyone, and the latter for her self communicating with someone she loves. 
English can express different aspects of the particularized public self, too, but 
in a different way from Japanese. This applies to pronouns used for what Haiman 
(1995 :229) calls cases of the most extreme self-alienation, as in (22): 
(22) I'm in charge of me. 
According to Haiman, this example "occurs in copy for a body-building 
advertisement" that offers a good context where "the subject/speaker I is treating the 
object me as an entirely separate entity." This effect comes from the me that occurs 
in the context where a reflexive is grammatically expected to occur in its place. 
Since the speaker maintains his physical identity when he refers to himself as 
me in the same clause in which I is the subject, it is not exact to say that he treats a 
part of himself as "an entirely separate entity," as Haiman says. It is more exact to 
say that he treats a part of himself as having an occasionally different role in (22), 
where I refers to a role of the particularized public self who communicates with 
others in one occasion and me to another role of the self communicating with still 
others in another occasion. Thus, two different roles of the particularized public 
self can be expressed in terms of the apparent violation of the Binding Condition A 
in the sense of Chomsky ( 1981 ), which, in our terms, are responsible for formulation 
of clauses as expressing two instances of the self to be in the same occasion. 
The arguments so far presented result in the following conceptual person 
hierarchy in the form of a tree diagram, where the two triangles stand for dialogue: 
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(23) ~rdpcrson 
~ Af 2nd person (indefinite) 
pa. pu. self 2nd person (identifiable) 
/ pr. self 
In (23 ), "ge. pu. self," "pa. pu. self~ and "pr. self' mean "generalized public self," 
"particularized public self~ and "private self," respectively. The hierarchy shows 
that self-reference makes, to cite Hirose's words, a "three-tier model" in that it has 
one tier for the private self and two tiers for the public self: the first tier, 
represented by zibun, does not constitute dialogue, but the tiers for the particularized 
and the generalized public self do, accompanying second person addressees. The 
third person is located where neither dialogue participant can talk with that person. 
The hierarchy implies that the first, second and third person distinctions come 
from the presence of an addressee: the speaker addresses her to express himself in 
the first person, and need to have a third person term to refer to someone other than 
her. Thus, the private self without coming into dialogue is conceptually a third 
person, because it refers to an inner person with whom the addressee cannot talk. 
Among the terms for self-reference, only those for the particularized public 
self are strictly first-person singulars; they alone are used by speakers who face 
identifiable addressees in the canonical situation of utterance ( cf. Lyons ( 1977:63 7) ), 
and are exchanged with the second person singular in turn. Besides, the other two 
levels of a speaker's self can be referred to with non-first person forms, too. This 
means that the first person is a subpart of self-reference specialized for dialogue. 
In support of the hierarchy, I now show that the generic one in English is 
located at the branching node A in (23 ), a position for expressing both the addressee 
and the generalized public self, and the generic one is ambiguous between the two. 
Moltmann (2006) notes that generic sentences starting with one like (24a) are 
oriented to the first person in expressing generalizations from the speaker's own 
experience, and so they express a generalization from the experience of the higher 




One can see the picture from the entrance. 
John found out that one can see the picture from the entrance. 
One should not lie. 
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Moltmann says that the generic one in deontic sentences like (25), however, applies 
primarily to the addressee's experience and only secondarily to the speaker's. 
Moltmann does not answer why the generic one is oriented to the local first 
person in (24), and to the second person in (25), but the present account can derive it 
from the position given to the generic one in (23A): it denotes an aspect of the 
speaker's generalized public self in the context where he takes the role of what Sells 
(1987:455) calls "source," which refers to "the one who makes the report." 
In a context expressing what originates from a person's internal factors like 
ability, as in (24a), the speaker takes his generalized public self as an instance of the 
typical, for he is ready to take the source role, and be the one who makes the report 
about his ability. By contrast, in a context expressing what originates from social 
agreements like duty, as in (25), the speaker regards any of his addressees as such an 
instance: he cannot take the source role here, for he alone is not sufficient to be the 
one who makes the report about a social agreement, but an addressee in dialogue 
with him is, which brings about the second person orientation of the generic one. 
Like the indefinite you in English, the modal hito in Japanese follows the 
heuristic in ( 1 0) to likewise function like a quantifier in contexts like those in (26): 
(26) a. 
b. 
Hito ni-wa hito-no ikikata-ga aru. 
person LOC-TOP person-GEN life.style-NOM exist 
'There is a person's life for each person.' 
Hi to-ga 
person-NOM 
hito-no zenryoku-o dasu to-iu 
person-GEN full.power-ACC exert QUOT-say 
ziki-ga omae-n1 atte mo y01. 
period.in.life-NOM you-LOC exist also good 
'It is also good for you to have a period in life when a person (the 
addressee) exert his full power.' 
In (26), the reference of the second occurrence of hito (hito2) covaries with that of 
its first occurrence (hitoi), for the modal hito can cover two levels of reference 
involved in representing the generalized public self; hito 1 functions as a quantifier, 
and hito2 denotes an instance of the quantified referents. Thus, (26a) is interpreted 
as follows: for every person x, including the addressee, there is a lifestyle that x 
adopts. Although being referential to an exchangeable role in dialogue, the modal 
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hito resembles zibun in ( 4) in being anaphoric to the topic, since it likewise denotes 
what is common to all the instances referred to, including the dialogue participants. 
The example in (27) is acceptable only in the reading in which hito refers to a 
separate species of human beings, in contrast to a species of apes, for example, but 
not, in the reading in which it is intended to refer to a dialogue participant: 
(27) (*)Hito-ni-wa hito-no ikikata-ga a-tta. 
person-LOC-TOP person-GEN life.style-NOM exist-PAST 
'There was a person's life for a person.' 
This sentence in past tense describes a particular situation in the past, and cannot be 
equally relevant to any person, so either speaker or addressee cannot apply the 
heuristic in ( 1 0), failing to let the reference of the hi to be replicated to him or to her. 
The modal hito shares the replicability of addressing with the indefinite you, 
and likewise functions like a generic quantifier which ranges over dialogues in 
which the speaker uses it to address the addressee. Compared with you, it has a 
narrower sense to be replicated over the sentence meaning and the quality of its user, 
and thus it occurs only in the sentence which, as a whole, expresses what it 
expresses, i.e. in the sentence expressing what an ethically good person does, and 
only in the dialogue whose participants are supposed to be ethically good people. 
The contexts for the self-referential hito are more limited than those for the 
self-referential you. An English speaker may use you for self-reference only with 
his own assumption that what he talks about himself is a normal case with which the 
addressee finds empathy, i.e. a generalized case about which she is supposed to do 
the same as he does. By contrast, a Japanese speaker can use hito for self-reference 
only when his addressee does not qualify as an ethically good person for him, and 
thus only in the utterance with which he tells her that he is angry at her. 
This difference in self-referential use between you and hito offers evidence for 
Hirose's hypothesis that Japanese is a private self-centered language, and English is 
a public self-centered, more precisely, a generalized public self-centered, language. 
Assuming that English is a generalized public self-centered language, an 
English speaker can use you for self-reference in his own right. Since he can use 
you to refer to anyone as an instance of the generalized public self, the easiest way 
for him to offer such an instance is to make one out of himself. Without bothering 
to check whether someone other than himself is a normal speaker or not, he has only 
to assume himself to be one who talks about what he takes to be a normal thing. 
On the other hand, assuming that Japanese is a private self-centered language, 
a Japanese speaker who refers with hi to to a generalized public self has to put 
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priority on reference to someone other than himself or indirectly to the addressee 
and puts a low priority on his self-reference, because it is by far easier for him to 
find an instance of an ethically good person in someone else than to disqualify 
others from the status of an ethically good person in order to find it only in himself. 
He is allowed to make the latter choice by way of an utterance audible to his 
addressee only when he has enough reason to disqualify her from that status. This 
is the case where she is excluded from the proper dialogue participants because he is 
angry at her, which justifies him to use hito for self-reference in front of her. 
Thus, Hirose's hypothesis is able to account for the difference in priority for 
self-reference between the self-referential you and the self-referential hito in terms 
of the difference of the central self a speaker can have in English or in Japanese. 
I have argued that the public self has the two levels of the particularized and 
the generalized public self. We are now in a position to answer why there are such 
two levels. The two levels are in line with the difference between the speaker's 
self-reference in face of an identifiable addressee and his self-reference in face of an 
indefinite addressee, i.e. anyone who can be an addressee, and reflect the following 
correlation between speaker's identity and addressee's identity. The higher the 
level of identity the addressee has, the more personal the speaker becomes to choose 
the particularized public self, and the lower the level of identity she has, the more 
generalized and the less personal he becomes to choose the generalized public self. 
6. Conclusion 
Hirose's account is clear where there is a clear contrast between the speaker's 
self-reference and his addressing the addressee, but, as we have seen, there are cases 
where the contrast is unclear and the latter also serves as the former. To deal with 
such cases, I introduced and defended the concept of the generalized public self, 
which is assigned to the speaker as a normal or ethically good dialogue participant. 
Hirose's argument is inner-oriented; he claims that zibun represents an inner 
constant part of every speaker which is responsible for his thinking in words, which 
is called the private self. My argument is outer-oriented in that I focus on what is 
constant between every pair of speaker and addressee in dialogue. This is realized 
as the generalized public self, by the speaker who addresses the addressee by the 
indefinite you in English, and the one who does indirectly by hito in Japanese. 
Because zibun represents an internal aspect common to any speaker's mind, it 
is accordingly quantified when a set of speakers is quantified. By contrast, you and 
hito quantify their referents as they are used for addressing, for, like quantified noun 
phrases like every boy, their reference may replicate itself with the speaker's 
replicable act of addressing by them. Since interrelations of quantifiers and bound 
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pronouns belong to semantics rather than pragmatics, this is a case of pragmatic 
reduction of semantic concepts expressed by quantifiers ( cf. Levinson (2000)). 
The referential properties of terms standing for the public self will be more 
clearly understood in the three-tier model if it incorporates the role of dialogue to 
consider not only terms standing for the speaker, but also those standing for the 
addressee. This article is intended to be a proposal for this research orientation. 
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